Recent headlines about Tesla board compensation have reignited a familiar, and often reflexive, debate: how much is too much? It is an easy question, and the wrong one. 

The more consequential issue for boards and shareholders alike is whether director compensation frameworks are still “fit for purpose” in a governance environment that has grown materially more complex, more adversarial, and more global. If board service has quietly evolved into a role that requires greater time, sharper judgment, and higher reputational risk, then our assumptions about compensation deserve a closer look. 

For decades, we have wrapped board service in the language of altruism. Directors “give back.” They “serve.” Compensation is something one accepts politely, not something one interrogates. That framing may once have reflected reality. It no longer does. 

The quiet transformation of board service 

Modern independent directors are underwriting risk with three forms of capital: time,  judgment, and reputation. 

The workload has expanded dramatically. Boards now oversee cyber and AI risk,  geopolitical exposure, regulatory volatility, activist preparedness, executive succession under pressure, and culture as a leading indicator of enterprise risk. Learning curves are shorter. Expectations are higher. Mistakes, especially visible ones, come with greater consequences. 

The environment has also changed. Outside actors: proxy advisory firms, activists, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and social media have made board service more personal. Disagreements over judgment are increasingly framed as failures of character. Reputational exposure is no longer a remote concern; it is part of the job. 

And the market has changed. Independent directorships are no longer filled primarily through CEO relationships. They are globally competed-for roles, with real scarcity around  directors who combine operating credibility, risk fluency, the ability to govern under stress and the required bandwidth to meet the moment. 

All of this matters when we talk about compensation. 

Compensation as a decision factor, not the decision itself

None of this suggests that board service should be motivated primarily by money. It should not be. Purpose, curiosity, and stewardship still matter deeply. But it is no longer credible to pretend that compensation should not matter at all. 

In any rational market, sought-after professionals weigh the full equation: time commitment, risk exposure, reputational stakes, and opportunity cost. Board service should be no different. All else being equal, compensation should be a legitimate, albeit secondary, factor in deciding whether to accept a role. 

The prevailing governance posture: “you get what you get and you don’t get upset”, is increasingly misaligned with reality. That posture is further strained by the fact that boards set their own pay, creating awkwardness within the board and the compensation committee and understandable skepticism among investors. 

The answer, however, is not denial. It is design and transparency. 

A comparative reality check 

Looking across major governance markets reveals a tension that deserves more scrutiny than it receives. 

 This is not a moral judgment about which system is “right.” Structural differences matter. Two-tier boards are different animals. Equity alignment raises legitimate independence concerns in some jurisdictions. 

But capital markets are global, board recruitment is increasingly global, and enterprise risk does not respect national compensation norms. 

Vignette: Global strategy, local pay norms 

Consider a UK-based public company with a growth strategy centered on the United States. 

Its ambition is real: U.S. customers, U.S. regulators, U.S. capital markets, and potential U.S. acquisitions. The board understands that success will require directors with first-hand experience navigating American regulatory complexity, activist dynamics, litigation  exposure, and market expectations. 

The nominating committee identifies several outstanding candidates, current and former executives with deep U.S. operating and governance experience. Each is intrigued by the strategy. 

And each pauses. 

Not because of purpose. Not because of interest. But because the expectations — time,  travel, committee workload, crisis availability, reputational exposure — are unmistakably global, while the compensation framework remains firmly local. 

The board fills the seat. It always does. But the unanswered question is whether it filled the  seat with the best director for the strategy, or simply the best director willing to accept the terms. 

Where shareholder value is quietly at risk 

This is not about fairness to directors. It is about outcomes for shareholders. 

Persistently underpricing board work does not show up immediately in TSR. It shows up indirectly: in narrower talent pools, overstretched committee chairs, slower escalation during crises, and reduced willingness or capacity to rigorously challenge management as complexity increases.  

These are not failures of character. They are failures of design. 

What the Tesla moment actually teaches

Tesla’s compensation controversy is instructive not because it proves directors are  overpaid, but because it highlights how poorly structured pay can undermine trust, invite litigation, and distract from oversight. 

Excessive, opaque, or option-heavy compensation can compromise perceived independence just as surely as underpayment can hollow out accountability. Alignment matters, but so does restraint. 

The lesson is not escalation, it is intentionality. 

A better governance standard 

Boards that want to address compensation credibly should anchor to a few principles:

• Benchmark for complexity, not just size 
• Distinguish base service from incremental burden 
• Align with equity thoughtfully and simply 
• Explain the rationale in plain language 
• Engage shareholders early 

The closing truth 

We still call it board service, and we should. But service does not mean self-denial. Good stewardship includes confronting governance design risks, including whether board  structures and compensation remain fit for today’s demands. 

Directors are not being paid for prestige. They are being paid to absorb complexity,  shoulder accountability, and lend reputations built over decades to enterprises that need  them. 

Boards don’t need to justify paying directors more. 

They need to justify paying them appropriately. 

Questions Boards Should Ask About Director Compensation 

• What assumptions are embedded in our compensation model about time, availability, and crisis work? Are they still accurate? 
• Does our pay structure reflect committee leadership as a materially heavier role?
• Are we implicitly narrowing our talent pool by underpricing the skills we say we need? 
• How does our compensation signal seriousness about governance to candidates  and shareholders? 
• Could we explain our approach clearly and confidently to our largest investors?

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